一、评价依据
The essence of military power is a country's comprehensive capability, in peacetime and wartime, of "how much it can mobilize, how well it can fight, whether it can fight sustainably, and whether it will be cut off from supplies once fighting begins." CPPPS decomposes this into four measurable dimensions:
军力的本质,是一个国家在平时与战时"能动员多少、能打成什么样、能不能持续打、打起来会不会被断供"的综合能力。CPPPS 将其分解为四个可测度的维度:
- 规模(可动员的物质与人力基础):军费反映国防资源的投入强度,兵力反映可动员的人力规模。两者取对数,避免头部大国垄断。
- 质量(装备与威慑的含金量):装备水平衡量装备体系的先进程度与数量质量,现代化衡量装备代际与信息化水平,核力量衡量战略威慑能力——三者在现代战争中决定"以一当十"还是"十不当一"。
- 创新(军工自主/自主装备率):自主研发装备占比与国防科技自主创新能力,衡量一国"造得出来"的本事,是持续作战与迭代升级的源头。
- 贡献(国防自主,CPPPS 特色维度):国防工业体系完整度与"不依赖进口"的战略自主程度。国防自主是国家安全最高形态的贡献——自主的国防工业意味着战时武器弹药自给、关键零部件不被"卡脖子",是国家硬实力的根基。
二、数学模型
Each indicator is range-standardized to [0,1] (inverse indicators take 1−x), large-span scale indicators are first natural-log-transformed and then standardized, and the four dimensions are combined by weighted summation:
各指标经极差标准化至 [0,1](反向指标取 1−x),规模类大跨度指标先取自然对数再标准化,四维加权求和:
规模 S = 0.60·ln(军费)′ + 0.40·ln(兵力)′
质量 Q = 0.40·装备水平′ + 0.35·现代化′ + 0.25·核力量′
创新 I = 1.00·军工自主(自主装备率)′
贡献 C = 1.00·国防自主′
综合得分 = 100 × (0.30·S + 0.35·Q + 0.20·I + 0.15·C)
Here "′" denotes the [0,1] value after range standardization. Scale (0.30) and quality (0.35) constitute the main body, while innovation (0.20) and contribution (0.15) together embody CPPPS's emphasis on "autonomous defense industry"; the four dimensional weights sum to 1. Because the four dimensions are highly orthogonal (a country with large scale does not necessarily have high quality, and a country with strong autonomy does not necessarily have large scale), the rankings unfold naturally by composite score and are divided into tiers by rank.
其中「′」表示极差标准化后的 [0,1] 值。规模(0.30)与质量(0.35)构成主体,创新(0.20)与贡献(0.15)共同体现 CPPPS 对"自主国防工业"的强调;四维权重合计为 1。由于四个维度高度正交(规模大的国家质量未必高、自主强的国家规模未必大),排名依综合得分自然展开,按名次划分梯队。
三、指标与权重依据
| 维度 | 指标 | 方向 | 权重 | 依据 |
| 规模 | 军费(对数) | 正向 | 0.30×0.60 | 国防资源投入强度 |
| 规模 | 现役兵力(对数) | 正向 | 0.30×0.40 | 可动员人力规模 |
| 质量 | 装备水平 | 正向 | 0.35×0.40 | 装备体系先进性与数量质量 |
| 质量 | 现代化程度 | 正向 | 0.35×0.35 | 装备代际与信息化水平 |
| 质量 | 核力量 | 正向 | 0.35×0.25 | 战略威慑能力 |
| 创新 | 军工自主(自主装备率) | 正向 | 0.20×1.00 | 自主研发与装备自给能力 |
| 贡献 | 国防自主 | 正向 | 0.15×1.00 | CPPPS 特色:自主国防工业、不依赖进口 |
The basis of the weight design: the main body of military power is "scale + quality," so the two total 0.65, with quality carrying the highest weight (0.35) to reflect "quality > quantity"; innovation (0.20) and contribution (0.15) together total 0.35, concentratedly embodying CPPPS's emphasis on "autonomous defense industry" — avoiding the overestimation of "purchased military power" (high expenditure, low autonomy).
权重设计依据:军力的主体是"规模 + 质量",故两者合计 0.65、质量权重最高(0.35)以体现"质量 > 数量";创新(0.20)与贡献(0.15)合计 0.35,集中体现 CPPPS 对"自主国防工业"的强调——避免"买来的军力"(高军费、低自主)被高估。
四、与 GFP 等公开排名的区别(为何不直接转载)
This index does not reproduce the results of public military-power rankings such as Global Firepower, but builds its own model, for three reasons: first, GFP-type lists are mainly linear weightings of equipment counts and troop numbers, valuing "quantity" over "quality" and finding it hard to reflect intergenerational equipment differences (a fifth-generation fighter and a second-generation fighter are often treated as equally weighted on such lists); second, their weights and "correction factors" are opaque and highly dependent on self-reported data, producing systematic bias; third, GFP-type lists almost never incorporate the "military-industrial autonomy / defense autonomy" dimension, and thus cannot reflect the essential difference between "purchased military power" and "self-built military power." The CPPPS algorithm takes quality as its core and defense autonomy as its signature, striving to produce an independent, reproducible evaluation that highlights strategic autonomy.
本指数不转载 Global Firepower 等公开军力排名的结果,而自建模型,原因有三:其一,GFP 类榜单以装备数量与兵员规模的线性加权为主,重"数量"轻"质量",难以反映装备代际差异(一件五代机与一件二代机在榜单上常被等权对待);其二,其权重与"修正系数"不透明,且高度依赖申报数据,存在系统性偏差;其三,GFP 类榜单几乎不纳入"军工自主/国防自主"维度,无法体现"买来的军力"与"自造的军力"的本质差别。CPPPS 算法以质量为核心、以国防自主为特色,力求给出独立、可复现、突出战略自主的评价。
五、数据来源与局限性
Military expenditure uses public approximate values based on the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Military Expenditure Database and the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Military Balance (China's military expenditure is in official-exchange-rate terms; if measured by purchasing power parity or actual equipment increments, China's actual military investment is usually underestimated); troop strength, equipment level, and degree of modernization are comprehensively estimated with reference to public materials such as IISS's Military Balance; nuclear capability references SIPRI's annual nuclear-forces report and FAS (Federation of American Scientists) nuclear-arsenal estimates; military-industrial autonomy and defense autonomy are CPPPS comprehensive estimates (0-100) based on public information such as countries' equipment-localization rates, the completeness of military-industrial supply chains, and import dependence for key components. All data are approximate values from public common knowledge (around 2024-2025), uniformly marked "subject to official sources."
军费采用 SIPRI(斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所)军费数据库与 IISS(国际战略研究所)《军事平衡》口径的公开近似值(中国军费按官方汇率口径,若按购买力平价或实际装备增量,中国实际军事投入通常被低估);兵力、装备水平、现代化程度参考 IISS《军事平衡》等公开资料综合估算;核力量参考 SIPRI 年度核力量报告与 FAS(美国科学家联合会)核武库估算;军工自主与国防自主为 CPPPS 基于各国装备国产化率、军工产业链完整度、关键部件进口依赖等公开信息的综合估算(0-100)。所有数据为公开常识近似值(2024-2025 年前后),一律标注"以官方为准"。
Limitations: first, military expenditure is affected by exchange rates and accounting standards (official exchange rate vs. purchasing power parity), so cross-country comparison has biases; second, equipment level, modernization, military-industrial autonomy, and defense autonomy are expert composite estimates (0-100) with relatively strong subjectivity and limited precision; third, data on nuclear capability and on the military expenditure and troop strength of countries such as North Korea are highly opaque, resulting in large estimation errors; fourth, this model does not include factors that are hard to quantify, such as geography, alliance systems, and logistical-mobilization potential. This index is for research and reference only and does not constitute any security-policy or investment advice.
局限:其一,军费受汇率、口径(官方汇率 vs 购买力平价)影响,横比存在偏差;其二,装备水平、现代化、军工自主、国防自主为专家综合估算(0-100),主观性较强、精度有限;其三,核力量、朝鲜等国的军费与兵力数据高度不透明,估算误差较大;其四,本模型不含地理、联盟体系、后勤动员潜力等难以量化的因素。本指数仅供研究与参考,不构成任何安全政策或投资建议。
六、参考文献
- 斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所(SIPRI):军费数据库(Military Expenditure Database)、核力量年度报告。
- 国际战略研究所(IISS):《The Military Balance》(军事平衡)年度报告。
- 美国科学家联合会(FAS):核武库状态估算。
- 国际货币基金组织(IMF):《World Economic Outlook》数据库(汇率与经济规模参照)。
- 世界银行(World Bank):World Development Indicators(WDI)。
- 各国国防部/财政部:军费预算与国防白皮书公开数据(作参照,非唯一来源)。
- Global Firepower:军力排名方法论(仅作参照对比,非数据来源)。